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Abstract:    This work re-examined the simulation result of game analysis (Joshi et al., 2000) based on an agent-based model, 
Santa Fe Institute Artificial Stock Market. Allowing for recent research work on this artificial model, this paper’s modified game 
simulations found that the dividend amplitude parameter is a crucial factor and that the original conclusion still holds in a not long 
period, but only when the dividend amplitude is large enough. Our explanation of this result is that the dividend amplitude pa-
rameter is a measurement of market uncertainty. The greater the uncertainty, the greater the price volatility, and so is the risk of 
investing in the stock market. The greater the risk, the greater the advantage of including technical rules. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Santa Fe Institute Artificial Stock Market 
(SFI-ASM) is a stochastic discrete event agent based 
model that simulates a market in which a number of 
agents choose between investing in a risk-free bond 
with a fixed interest rate, and a stock with an autore-
gressive stochastic dividend. In contrast to mathe-
matical models of stock markets based on unrealistic 
assumptions of agents’ knowledge and processing 
power, the model had been shown to demonstrate 
features observed in real markets. It was developed in 
1989 and had been described in various papers 
(Palmer et al., 1994; Arthur et al., 1997; LeBaron et 
al., 1999; 2002). The original software, written in C, 
then in Objective-C for the NeXTstep architecture, 
was converted by Johnson (2002) for use with Swarm. 
Both are open sources and available at http:// 
artstkmkt.sourceforge.net/.  
One of SFI-ASM’s main results is the identifi-
cation of a single parameter, i.e., the learning speed of 
agents, which can shift the model to either a regime 
that is close to the homogeneous rational expectation 
equilibrium, or to a more complex regime that better 
fits the empirical facts. The complex regime emerges 
for fast learning rates and exhibited technical trading 
that dominated fundamental strategies. Consequently, 
Joshi  et al.(2000; 2002) concluded that financial 
markets inevitably are at sub-optimal equilibria, and 
that technical trading is caused by a typical prisoner’s 
dilemma. In recent research works, Ehrentreich (2005) 
claimed that the original SFI-ASM GA mutation 
operator was biased. In his corrected version (His 
version is programmed in Java and uses the Repast 
library 1.4.1), the emergence of technical trading 
rules does not occur and the homogeneous rational 
expectation equilibrium is reached.  
Allowing for recent research work on this arti-
ficial model, this paper’s modified game simulation 
still found that the use of technical trading bits is a 
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dominant strategy and that the prisoner’s dilemma 
holds in a not long period, but only when the dividend 
amplitude is large enough. Our explanation of this 
result is that the dividend amplitude parameter can be 
regarded as a measurement of the dividend uncer-
tainty. This uncertainty is then transferred to agent’s 
expectation of future price and dividend. The greater 
the uncertainty, the greater the price volatility, and so 
is the risk of investing in the stock market. The greater 
the risk, the greater the advantage of including tech-
nical rules. 
Section 2 below describes the Santa Fe Institute 
Artificial Stock Market model that we used in our 
argument, Section 3 explains the game analysis ex-
perimental framework, Section 4 and 5 present and 
explain the results of our experiment, and Section 6 
ends with the summary and conclusion. 
 
 
SANTA FE INSTITUTE ARTIFICIAL STOCK 
MARKET 
 
Brief introduction 
Santa Fe Institute Artificial Stock Market, one of 
the first agent-based models of a financial market, 
was developed by Brian Arthur, John Holland, Blake 
LeBaron, Richard Palmer, Paul Tayler, and Brandon 
Weber. The basic economic structure of the market 
draws heavily on existing market setups such as those 
of Bray (1982) and Grossma and Stiglitz (1980). The 
model is inhabited by a population of myopic, im-
perfectly rational, heterogeneous agents who make 
investment decisions by forecasting the future states 
of the market, and who also learn from their experi-
ence over time. The model illustrates how simple 
interactions among such agents may lead to the ap-
pearance of the realistic structure itself. 
 
The model 
Agents, initially endowed with one unit of risky 
stock and 20000 units of cash, have to decide during 
each time period of the simulation how much to invest 
in risky stock and how much to keep in cash assets 
yielding a risk-free rate of return.  
The stock pays a stochastic dividend per period 
which is generated by a stationary AR(1)-process 
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where 
2 ~( 0 , ) t N µ µσ (Its behavior is denoted by the 
dividend amplitude parameter amplitude = /(d µ σ × 
2 1) ρ −  in the source code and also in this paper), 
and  d =10,  ρ=0.95 for all experiments. It is well 
known that assuming CARA utility functions and 
Gaussian distributions for dividend and prices, the 
demand for holding shares of the risky asset by agent i 
is given by 
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where pt is the price of the risky asset at t, 
2
,, tip d σ + is 
the conditional variance of “p+d” at time t for agent i, 
γ is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion, and 
Et,i(pt+1+dt+1) is the expectation for agent i at time t.  
Agents do this by forecasting the price of the 
stock, and assessing its risk (measured by the variance 
of the prices). Forecasting rules are IF-THEN state-
ments: IF (a certain market state occurs) THEN (a 
certain forecast is made). 
Agents can recognize two different kinds of 
market states: technical and fundamental. A market 
state detected by an agent is “technical” if it identifies 
a pattern in the past price history, and is fundamental 
if it identifies an immediate over- or under-valuation 
of the stock. The market states are summarized in a 
binary state vector 12 bits long. Each element corre-
sponds to whether the conditions in Table 1 are true or 
false. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  MA: moving average 
Table 1  Condition bits   
Bit Conditions 
0  Price×interest/dividend>1/4 
1  Price×interest/dividend>1/2 
2  Price×interest/dividend>3/4 
3  Price×interest/dividend>7/8 
4  Price×interest/dividend>1 
5  Price×interest/dividend>9/8 
6  Price×interest/dividend>4 
7  Price>5-period MA 
8  Price>20-period MA 
9  Price>100-period MA 
10  Price>500-period MA 
11 On:  1 
12 Off:  0 Liu et al. / J Zhejiang Univ SCIENCE A   2006 7(4):564-569  566
One forecasting rule is said to be activated if the 
market state in a period matches its descriptor. Be-
cause a number of forecasting rules may be activated 
at a given time, the agent must make a choice from 
them and decide which of the active forecasts to use 
by choosing at random among the active forecasts 
with a probability proportional to its accuracy, a 
measure that indicates how well the rule has per-
formed in the past. Once the agent has chosen a spe-
cific rule to use, an investment decision follows to 
determine how much stock to buy, sell or hold, using a 
standard risk-aversion calculation. Agents then sub-
mit their decisions to the market specialist, an extra 
agent in the market whose work is to declare a mar-
ket-cleaning price. 
Genetic Algorithm (GA) (Holland, 1975; Gold-
berg, 1989; Mitchell, 1996) provides for the evolution 
of the population of forecasting rules over time. 
Whenever the GA is invoked, it substitutes new 
forecasting rules for a fraction of the least-fit fore-
casting rules in each agent’s pool of rules. A rule’s 
success or “fitness” is determined by its accuracy and 
by how complex it is (the GA is biased against com-
plex rules). New rules are created by applying the 
genetic operators of mutation and crossover to the bit 
strings of the more successful rules in the agent’s rule 
pool. 
It is important to note that agents in this model 
learn in two ways: First, as each rule’s accuracy varies 
from time period to time period, each agent preferen-
tially uses the more accurate of the rules available to it; 
second, on an evolutionary time scale, the pool of 
rules as a whole improves through the action of the 
genetic algorithm. 
 
Experimental results 
The most significant early finding was that this 
market exhibits two quite different kinds of behavior, 
corresponding to different rates at which mar-
ket-forecasting rules are being revised by the genetic 
algorithm. When the GA-invocation interval is large 
(between 1000 and 10000) resulting in forecasting 
rules evolving relatively slowly, prices are more sta-
ble; evolved forecasting rules are simple; levels of 
technical trading are low; trading volumes are low; 
and there is little evidence of nonlinearity. Since this 
kind of behavior resembles the predictions of the 
theory of efficient markets, this regime has been 
termed the “Rational Expectation Regime” (SFI 
Bulletin, 1999). 
On the other hand, when the GA-invocation in-
terval is small (between 10 and 100) it results in 
forecasting rules evolving relatively quickly, and the 
variance of the price time series is relatively high; the 
evolved rules are complex; levels of technical trading 
are high; trading volumes are higher; and there is 
strong evidence of nonlinearity. This regime is called 
the “Complex Regime” (SFI Bulletin, 1999). 
Since the 1990s, Joshi, Parker and Bedau have 
been further studying the dynamics of the ASM (Joshi 
et al., 2000; 2002). Using a simple game theoretical 
model together with the Santa Fe Institute Stock 
Market, they showed that the market has only one 
symmetric Nash equilibrium, and that this equilib-
rium lays in the “Complex Regime”. Most important 
of all, they concluded that financial markets inevita-
bly are at sub-optimal equilibria, and that technical 
trading is caused by a typical prisoner’s dilemma. 
In recent research works, Ehrentreich (2005)
 
claimed that the original SFI-ASM GA mutation 
operator was biased. In his corrected version, the 
emergence of technical trading rules does not occur 
and the homogeneous rational expectation equilib-
rium is reached. What is more, he claimed that the 
game analysis conclusion (Joshi et al., 2000; 2002) 
can be partly replicated with his modified version 
only at a not long simulation period. 
 
 
GAME ANALYSIS SIMULATION 
 
Most of the original experimental framework 
(Joshi et al., 2000) is followed in this paper except for 
the implementing details. To investigate whether or 
not including technical trading rules is advantageous 
for traders, we contemplate a single agent confronted 
with a choice between two strategies: either to include 
technical trading rules in the agent’s repertoire of 
trading rules, or to exclude them entirely and instead 
use only fundamental rules. The agent assumes that 
other traders in the market all follow one or the other 
of these two strategies (either include all technical 
trading rules or exclude of them), but the agent does 
not know which of these two possibilities occurs.  
Thus, the agent confronts a classic 2×2 decision 
problem. To make a rational decision, the agent needs Liu et al. / J Zhejiang Univ SCIENCE A   2006 7(4):564-569  567
to know the relative value or payoff of each choice in 
each situation. This paper’s criterion for social and 
individual welfare is relative wealth
1. So, to deter-
mine the payoffs in the decision matrix, we observed 
the relative wealth of the agent in four different con-
ditions: (1) The agent includes technical rules and all 
other traders include them; (2) The agent includes 
technical rules and all other traders exclude them; (3) 
The agent excludes technical rules and all other trad-
ers include them; (4) The agent excludes technical 
rules and all other traders exclude them. 
By comparing the agent’s payoffs in these four 
possible situations, we can determine whether there is 
a dominant strategy for this decision
2. 
Since all agents in the market act independently 
and simultaneously, each time period in the market 
can be considered to be a multi-person simultane-
ous-move game. Furthermore, each agent’s decision 
can be construed in exactly the form of the single 
agent considered above. So, if the single-agent deci-
sion considered above has a dominant strategy, it will 
be rational for all agents to use it and the simultane-
ous-move game will reach a symmetric Nash equi-
librium (Bierman and Fernandez, 1993). Thus, situa-
tions (1) and (4) above are the only potential sym-
metric Nash equilibria in our context. 
Expected payoffs in situations (1)~(4) were de-
termined by simulating the artificial market
3 30 times 
in the four corresponding circumstances. In each 
simulation, there were 26 agents in the market: one 
agent following a given strategy and 25 other agents 
all following another given strategy (possibly the 
same strategy as that of the single agent). Each 
simulation was run for 10000 time periods
4. The same 
30 random sequences for dividends and initial dis-
tributions of rule descriptors among agents were used 
for all four experiments. And the crucial 
GA-invocation interval 100 is followed (Joshi et al., 
2000; 2002). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Tables 2~4 shows the expected payoffs to the 
agent in the situations (1)~(4) at different dividend 
amplitude mentioned in Eq.(1). These payoffs were 
calculated by averaging the agent’s final relative 
wealth in repeated simulations of each of the four 
situations. These decision matrixes support two con-
clusions. 
First, although the wealth level difference is not 
as strong as the former research (Joshi et al., 2000) 
when dividend amplitude equals 0.0879 which is 
achieved by setting 
2
µ σ  in  equation  amplitude= 
2 /( 1 ) d µ σρ ×−  equal to 0.07429 (LeBaron et al., 
1999) (Table 2), their conclusion that technical trad-
ing emerges due to a prisoner’s dilemma, and that 
rational traders are technical traders can be upheld. In 
Table 2, note that since the payoff in situation (1) 
exceeds that in situation (3) and the payoff in situation 
(2) exceeds that in situation (4), no matter what 
strategy the other agents in the market might be using, 
it is always advantageous for the agent to include 
technical trading in his market forecasting rules. So 
including technical trading is the dominant strategy 
for each agent, and this is the one and only symmetric 
Nash equilibrium in this multi-person simultane-
ous-move game. What is more, since the expected 
payoff in situation (1) is less than that in situation (4), 
everyone is better off if no one includes technical 
trading. So, engaging in technical trading, which is 
apparently rational for each rational trader, leads the 
market to a sub-optimal state. 
Second, when dividend amplitude decreased 
(Table 3), the difference between relevant payoffs can 
be ignored allowing for the error bound, which means 
that the conclusion mentioned above can be hardly 
upheld. But when this amplitude increased (Table 4), 
the difference between relevant payoffs ample at the 
same time, which means that the former conclusion 
can be supported more steadily. 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
These findings raise an important question: what 
is the influence of dividend amplitude on agent’s 
wealth level in the SFI-ASM? From Eq.(1), the divid- 
1The relative wealth of an agent in the market is the ratio of final
wealth-interest payments from the risk free asset, returns from stocks,
and cash holdings (money not invested) over each initial cash holding
(all with 20000 units in our experiment). 
2A dominant strategy is defined as one that outperforms all other
strategies regardless of the strategies being used by other agents
(Bierman et al., 1993). 
3In this paper, ASM2.4, a Java version of SFI-ASM is used combined
with Swarm2.2, JDK 1.4.7 and Fedora Core 3 OS platform. 
4Allowing for Ehrentreich’s research, Joshi et al.(2000)’s simulation
time periods 300 000 is not followed. Liu et al. / J Zhejiang Univ SCIENCE A   2006 7(4):564-569  568
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
end amplitude parameter actually holds the same 
influence of µt, which can be regarded as a meas-
urement of the dividend uncertainty. This uncertainty 
is then transferred to agent’s expectation in Eq.(2). 
The greater the uncertainty, the greater the price 
volatility, and so is the risk of investing in the stock 
market. It seems that including technical rules bene-
fits much only in a little bit high risky market, which 
agrees with the empirical realization from practical 
use of technical trading. This explanation fits well 
with the results of our experiments. Fig.1 shows the 
simulation result of running SFI-ASM under the 
above-mentioned three different dividend amplitudes 
with all other parameters being same. In Fig.1a the 
stock price ranges roughly from 65 to 95, in Fig.1b 
roughly from 93 to 103, and in Fig.1c from 25 to 85. 
The greater the dividend amplitude, the greater the 
price volatility range, and so is the advantage of in-
cluding technical rules. 
 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
In this work, we re-examined the simulation re- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4  The same notes with Table 1 but dividend amplitude equals 0.14178 
 
All other traders 
                          Technical rules 
Technical rules included  Technical rules excluded 
Include  (1): 3.265±0.067  (2): 3.454±0.077  The agent 
Exclude  (3): 3.155±0.075  (4): 3.311±0.069 
Wealth level difference  (1)−(3): 0.110±0.008  (2)−(4): 0.143±0.008 
Table 3  The same notes with Table 1 but dividend amplitude equals 0.02727 
 
All other traders 
                          Technical rules 
Technical rules included  Technical rules excluded 
Include  (1): 1.139±0.023  (2): 1.141±0.028  The agent 
Exclude  (3): 1.141±0.030  (4): 1.131±0.028 
Wealth level difference  (1)−(3): −0.002±0.007 (2)−(4): 0.010±0.000 
Table 2  The decision table when dividend amplitude equals 0.0879 for an agent contemplating whether to include 
technical trading rules to make market forecasts, when the agent is uncertain whether or not the other traders in the 
market are doing so. The agent’s payoff in each of the four situations (1)~(4) is the agent’s expected relative wealth, 
derived by averaging the results of 30 simulations of each situation. Errors bounds are calculated using standard 
deviations of the 30 simulations 
 
All other traders 
                          Technical rules 
Technical rules included  Technical rules excluded 
Include   (1): 1.966±0.041  (2): 2.064±0.062  The agent 
Exclude   (3): 1.930±0.038  (4): 2.006±0.051 
Wealth level difference  (1)−(3): 0.036±0.003  (2)−(4): 0.058±0.011 
 
Fig.1  Price volatility (the actual price line) under divi-
dend amplitude equals 0.0879 (a), 0.02727 (b), 0.14178 (c) 
respectively with other parameters unchanged 
(a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) 
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sult of game analysis based on an agent-based model, 
Santa Fe Institute Artificial Stock Market, which 
found that the use of technical trading bits is a 
dominant strategy in the market. Allowing for recent 
research work on this artificial model, our simulations 
based on SFI-ASM suggest that the dividend ampli-
tude parameter is a crucial factor on deciding the 
influence of technical rules. Such parameter can be 
regarded as a measurement of market uncertainty. The 
greater the uncertainty, the greater the price volatility, 
and so is the risk of investing in the stock market. The 
greater the risk, the greater the advantage of including 
technical rules, which agrees with the empirical re-
alization from practical use of technical trading. And 
the prisoner’s dilemma conclusion mentioned in 
former research work (Joshi et al., 2000) can be much 
more firmly supported with large dividend amplitude 
in a not long period. 
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